]abs[In this paper, I explore a prognostic modality of environmental politics I call risk in retrospect. I do so by examining conflicts that are not just over the ability of state science to know and govern the future, but also its failure to have been able to do so in the past. I begin by discussing the 2009 earthquake that hit the Italian city of L'Aquila and then turn to a similar case in Colombia, both of which reflect the constitutive relationship between political authority and foresight. I then trace the strong historical precedent for this type of political situation in Colombia by discussing a key cultural referent -Gabriel García Márquez's 1981 book, Chronicle of a death foretold -as well as the convergence of two catastrophic events during one week in November 1985 that were both seen, in their aftermath, as 'tragedies foretold'. I conclude by considering what it would mean for prognosis to become the terrain on which citizens engage in political relationships with the state.
]p[This paper about Colombia begins in Italy, for Italy is home to a recent example of the prognostic tense of environmental politics. The situation I refer to is the 2009 earthquake that hit the Italian city of L'Aquila and the judicial decision handed down in 2012 to convict six scientists and one government official of manslaughter. They were guilty, the court ruled, of failing to give adequate warning to residents about the risk of an impending disaster -or, to paraphrase some of the more sensationalist media headlines, of not being able to predict the future. This case is significant not only because it may have farreaching consequences for the politics of disaster risk management or because it raises so many questions about the relationship between technical expertise, political authority, and legal accountability. It is also worth mentioning here for its ability to highlight the peculiar temporality of conflicts over the state's responsibility to know and govern the future, and its failure to have been able to do so in the past. In other words, it reflects a prognostic modality of environmental politics we might call risk in retrospect.
]p1[In early 2009, a series of small tremors was felt across the Abruzzo region east of Rome. The public's unease was heightened when a retired local laboratory technician began issuing unofficial predictions, based on homemade monitoring devices, that a major earthquake was imminent. The national risk commission then met in the city of L'Aquila on 31 March to evaluate the situation, concluding that the recent swarm of seismic activity only slightly increased the probability of a major event. In a press conference, a government spokesman communicated that there was no danger and that it was unnecessary to issue safety warnings or order evacuations. A week later, a 6.3 magnitude quake devastated the city, killing 309 people. Seven members of the risk commission were eventually taken to court by lawyers representing the victims' families. In support of the seismologists and geologists standing trial, an international coalition of more than 5,000 scientists issued an open letter to President Giorgio Napolitano. Their letter highlighted the scientific consensus that seismologists cannot predict when and where an earthquake will occur, and argued that the defendants were being prosecuted for failing to do the impossible. This was the primary argument put forth by the defence. But on 22
October 2012, the prosecution prevailed. Judge Marco Billi ruled that the defendants had communicated 'inexact, incomplete, and contradictory' information about the risk of a major earthquake; that they had lulled the public into a false sense of security with a deceptively reassuring statement; and that they had failed to give clear preparedness advice. The verdict: all seven were sentenced to six years in prison and ordered to pay over $10 million for court costs and damages.
]p1[Around the time of this ruling, Colombia was suffering from one of the worst rainy seasons on record. Amidst the deluge, President Juan Manuel Santos presided over the twenty-fifth anniversary of another catastrophic event: a volcanic eruption in 1985 that set off massive mudslides and buried the town of Armero, killing nearly 30,000 people. In his commemorative address, he urged Colombians to apply lessons learned from the earlier disaster to the current one in order to avoid falling into 'victim syndrome' (síndrome del damnificado).
1 Santos encouraged those affected by the recent storms to adopt 'an attitude of mutual collaboration and solidarity' and to emulate the patience and perseverance of the 13-year-old girl, Omayra Sánchez, whose (Bear 2014; Geertz 1973; Gell 1996; Greenhouse 1996; Munn 1992; Rabinow 2008 The sweeping phenomenon these scholars describe resonates throughout other works of social theory, which highlight the political implications of heightened anxiety about futurity and the subsequent proliferation of pre-emptive actions (Cooper 2006; Martin 2007; Massumi 2009; ' (2004: 2; cf. 2002) , then it logically follows that all forms of temporality are suffused with and constitutive of power (Greenhouse 1996 ). Yet while this ought to lead us to analyse futurity and its uneven effects on certain bodies, spaces, and populations, it would be a mistake to resort to automatic denunciations. For doing so would risk ascribing an almost totalizing quality to the politics of time, and leave us devoid of resources for thinking about the heterodox temporalities existing alongside and within dominant or hegemonic formations. 6 We need tools for analysing futurity as constitutive of both political authority and political possibility. ]p1[Simone's reflections suggest that temporality is mapped on to certain spatial configurations, such that the city, we might say, is a key 'chronotope of modern time' (Bakhtin 1981; Bear 2014) . In cities, the future is alongside us, upon us, all around us. The past, of course, is present, too. 11 But it is tempting to assume that (in some fundamental way) the city is orientated temporally towards horizons of possibility, expectations of change, and the anticipation of things to come. There is something misleading about this assumption, however, since it is rather peculiar to cities belonging to the category of the 'modern'. One of the defining characteristics of modernity was a belief in the progression of time towards a more efficient, more prosperous, and all-around better future; in turn, this promise hinged on the growth and development of cities and the domination of nature. 12 The 'modern city' was considered the most advanced stage of social evolution, historical progress, and cultural development against which all other spatial forms were judged.
And the destiny of places outside of Europe and North America was presumed to be a perpetual game of catch-up with Paris, London, and New York (Robinson 2004; Roy 2008 ).
]p1[These imagined futures came into question in the late twentieth century as teleological, evolutionist, and developmental narratives of all kinds began to lose credibility (Ferguson 2006: 176-93) . Today, it is more common to foresee futures of crisis, chaos, and catastrophe than to envision the emergence of ideal spaces and societies -conceptual resources for imagining alternative possibilities appear to be in short supply. Susan Buck-Morss (2000) famously attributed the 'passing of mass utopia', as she called it, to the exhaustion of the collective dreams of historical progress previously shared by East and West during the Cold War. With phrases like the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992) , the 'death of progress' (Levitas 1982) , the 'postdevelopment era' (Escobar 1992) , and 'living in the end times' (Žižek 2010) , others have made similarly epochal claims about the demise of the utopian imagination or of progressive thinking more broadly. These proclamations no doubt over-reach, and yet the weakening of grand narratives like 'modernization' and 'development' has made way for a radically different future -one neither certain nor desirable, but rather filled with uncertainty and marked by a rather grim sense of how history will unfold. Disaster, even apocalypse, looms large on the horizon. Although rural areas in the north of the country and along the Caribbean coast were hardest hit, urban areas, such as a suburb of Colombia's second largest city, Medellín, also witnessed grave tragedies. We could approach this situation by examining the models used to generate rainfall predictions and flood risk maps and their role in shaping the distribution of destruction and displacement. In temporal terms, our analytical position would then be both retrospective and prospective: looking back to the past to reveal the state's failure to prevent future disasters. Instead, I would like to draw attention to some of the conflicts that emerged during and after this period of flooding, which themselves revolved around both hindsight and foresight. Focusing on a specific flood event in the capital city, I will show how this temporal orientation was the ground for both political authority and critique.
]p1[On Monday, 5 December 2011, Bogotá's largest daily newspaper, El Tiempo, reported that, following a forty-eight-hour deluge, the Bogotá River was nearly overflowing its banks. Andrés González, the governor of Cundinamarca, the department that surrounds Bogotá, cautioned that water levels had risen sharply and could soon cause flooding downstream in the capital. These predictions came true the following afternoon. Another rainstorm developed, and the canals draining aguas negras (wastewater) from the city were blocked from conveying effluent to the Bogotá River, as they do under normal circumstances, owing to the river's abnormally high level.
Instead of discharging storm water and sewage, one of the drainage canals began to function as a reservoir, collecting wastewater and distributing it laterally across residential neighbourhoods in the peripheral locality of Bosa on Bogotá's southwestern edge. Wastewater not only rushed through the streets, but also percolated up through sewers and drains, and within hours had risen to nearly a metre in height. Residents retreated to the second floor of their homes until rescue workers arrived with inflatable boats to transport them to dry land.
Interim Mayor Clara López then declared an emergency and called on her staff
to identify where to discharge the Bogotá River's excess flow while pleading with bogotanos to limit water use immediately. 15 These responses were effective though insufficient, and the municipal water utility appealed to neighbouring countries to lend Bogotá a high-capacity pump used normally for petroleum extraction. 16 Aided by a respite of dry, sunny weather, these measures eventually succeeded in reducing the river's force and draining the inundated neighbourhoods. ]p1[Mayor López then accompanied President Santos to El Recreo, one of the most heavily affected areas, to begin the provision of humanitarian aid.
López had already agreed to provide tax relief as well as a rental subsidy of 550,000 pesos (US$300) to those forced by the flooding to evacuate their homes. 17 In addition, the municipal water utility had guaranteed fifteen days of free delivery. 18 Donning a red 'Colombia Humanitaria' windbreaker, Santos announced that the national government would provide an additional 1.5 million pesos (US$775) to each family adversely affected by the flooding.
19
The President estimated that more than 10,000 families would be eligible for aid, but said this was contingent upon an official census of the victims. 20 The
Secretary of Social Integration began compiling a registry by consulting the administrator of each residential housing complex and other community leaders. Bogotá's disaster-risk-management agency (FOPAE) followed with house-by-house inspections to determine the extent of property damage and the number of people affected. Although preliminary estimates were as low as 5,000 victims, FOPAE soon announced that the flooding had impacted over 45,000 people in total. 21 Once the official census was complete, the government issued a certificate of damages to each household, and the relief promised by López and Santos could be disbursed.
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]p1[Long lines formed wherever aid was being handed out, and residents declared that there was not enough for the number of families in need. Reports came back that there was no systematic process for allocating assistance; that food rations were being proportioned in an ad hoc manner. ]p1[The focus of public discontent soon shifted, however, as residents from the flooded neighbourhoods began blaming the authorities for having ignored the fact that the Bogotá River had overflowed its banks three times in recent years. They criticized the state for permitting development in high-risk zones and demanded accountability from the construction company that had knowingly built housing complexes in flood-prone areas. 26 las Américas, which protesters had brought to a standstill in the days after the flooding. As I transferred to a bus that ran alongside one of the canals conveying wastewater to the outskirts of the city, I detected the stench of raw sewage still floating in the air. Debris lay stranded along its edges and hung from the bottom branches of squat trees lining its banks. I got off at a bakery and spoke to a waitress who confirmed that I was getting close to the site of the floods. The water level had risen a couple of feet in this part of the neighbourhood, she said, and the bakery had been forced to close for days. She then indicated how to get to the area that had been badly affected. 'It's pretty much all cleaned up by now', she said, 'but you'll find people who are still angry. They knew something like this was going to happen, but nobody would ]ex[We all knew this was going to happen. A group of us, maybe forty in total, got together back in September to call attention to the risk of flooding in the area and to denounce the government for not doing anything to prevent it. Look it up. It was on 8 September.
City TV, Caracol, RCN, all the networks came to cover the story.
We told them they had to clean out all the debris in the canals before the next heavy rain. Acueducto [the water utility] did a bit of clean-up, but in general the government just ignored us. And as a result, they were not prepared in December when the weather got really bad. We knew this was going to happen. They did too, but they didn't do anything. They just waited, and then opened the floodgates once it was already too late. They have to be more (Fig. 1 ). Some were dressed formally in suit and tie while others were bundled up with scarves and hoods to ward off the cold morning air. Men and women of all ages faced the cameras with expressions conveying seriousness and conviction. The newscaster explained that residents were worried that the area's drainage system was inadequate to withstand the coming winter rains. Aided by handwritten signs, they warned of a potential threat that could lead to grave consequences, and asked the government to take immediate action (Fig. 2) . 
]ha[Tragedies foretold
]p[Like the debate surrounding the culpability of the Italian earthquake scientists, the case of flooding in Colombia involved not just the state's responsibility to know and govern the future, but also its failure to have done so in the past. This type of situation has strong precedent in Colombia. A book by Gabriel García Márquez, Crónica de una muerte anunciada (1981) , is a key cultural referent that has been used repeatedly, in Colombia and abroad, to give expression to tragedies that were foreseen but not avoided. Though not his most celebrated work, its circulation was boosted by the fact that García
Márquez was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature the year after its publication. An allegorical tale based on historical events that took place in the early 1950s in a sleepy town near the Caribbean coast, the novel is frequently referenced in ordinary conversation, but also by the media and politicians, to characterize undesirable occurrences that were anticipated but not averted.
While it would be an exaggeration to say that the structure of Chronicle of a death foretold typifies a particularly Colombian understanding of temporality, it nevertheless helps explain the prognostic modality of environmental politics under examination here. And while this modality is not uncommon, García
Márquez lent it both rhetorical form and moral authority such that it would become readily available as a frame for interpreting subsequent tragic events. Nearly everyone knows what is going to happen, and yet no one intervenes to prevent the murder. There are different reasons for this: some townspeople doubt the sincerity of the Vicario brothers' threats; others attempt unsuccessfully to warn the intended victim. In the end, Santiago is stabbed to death on the threshold of his family home.
]p1[The central problematic and temporal structure of this short work by the most recognized of modern Colombian authors parallel the prognostic modality of environmental politics described above. The narrator returns to the town many years after the murder, only to find evidence that everyone had known the killers' intentions ahead of time and had been unable to stop them from accomplishing the deed. The tale recounts not the inability to foresee future events, but rather the failure to act appropriately on the knowledge available prior to their occurrence. It is both retrospective and prospective, looking backward to a moment in time in which an event was about to take place and forward in time from that moment to a future that was known.
Neither the townspeople nor the authorities had stepped in to prevent the killing; the outcome was una muerte anunciada, a 'death foretold'.
]p1[Clearly referencing García Márquez's prescient story, two catastrophic events that converged during one week in November 1985 were both seen, in their aftermath, as tragedias anunciadas (or 'tragedies foretold').
On 6 of these tragedies reflects how they were made to constitute a crisis in which the government's inability to anticipate and avert them was seen as a monumental failure, and predictive, preventive, and pre-emptory techniques were the solutions proposed. Yet it is also retrospective: protesters responding to the Bogotá floods and lawyers representing the L'Aquila earthquake victims both positioned themselves simultaneously in the aftermath of these events when their consequences were already known and prior to them when prevention could (or should) have been possible. 36 They mobilized a combination of hindsight and foresight to demand accountability for the loss of life and livelihood.
]p1[While the latter formulation differs from the previous one in its attempt to hold the state accountable for an actual event in the past, they share one key element: without calling into question the imperative to render the future governable in the present, those engaging in this prognostic modality of environmental politics demanded more and better mechanisms of prediction, prevention, and preparedness. And rather than disputing the fact that their status as political subjects was predicated on their vulnerability or victimhood, they sought to mobilize concern for an additional threat or to recognize a larger group of victims. Thus, while positioning themselves as critical of the state, they ultimately reinforced the future-orientated rationality of security - exclusively on the future would risk mirroring the state's fixation on the virtual, the potential, and the possible. In contrast, focusing methodologically on the past allows us to contextualize the tight connection between foresight and political authority and responsibility. As political legitimacy is increasingly tied to knowledge about the future -of resources, of disasters, and of many other objects and events -our ability to understand the politics of prognosis becomes ever more urgent. We need to reflect critically on the strategic potential of prognosis for those usually resigned to simply wait for something better (or worse!) to come along.
]hx[NOTES My thanks go to Jessica Barnes for her tireless efforts in assembling this collection of essays, and to her and Andrew Matthews for editorial guidance.
Two anonymous reviewers also commented generously and provided helpful
suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2012 annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association. In Bogotá, my gratitude goes to Laura Astrid Ramírez for her research assistance. 4 For a related analysis of expectations surrounding innovations in the fields of heath and life science, see Brown & Michael (2003) . The authors propose the concepts of 'retrospecting prospects' and 'prospecting retrospects' as 'interpretive registers' through which people understand and discuss expectations of future change.
5 For similar diagnoses of temporal politics in urban studies, see Auyero & Swistun (2009 ), Mitchell (2009 ), and Yiftachel (2009 .
